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Abstract—In Android systems, an attacker can obfuscate
an application code to leak sensitive information. TaintDroid
is an information flow tracking system that protects private
data in smartphones. But, TainDroid cannot detect control
flows. Thus, it can be circumvented by an obfuscated code
attack based on control dependencies. In this paper, we
present a collection of obfuscated code attacks on TaintDroid
system. We propose a technical solution based on a hybrid
approach that combines static and dynamic analysis. We
formally specify our solution based on two propagation
rules. Finally, we evaluate our approach and show that
we can avoid the obfuscated code attacks based on control
dependencies by using these propagation rules.
Keywords-Android system; Code obfuscation attacks; Con-
trol dependencies; Leakage of sensitive information; Infor-
mation flow tracking; Propagation rules
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices such as smartphones are increasingly
used in our daily lives. To satisfy smartphones user’s
requirements, the development of smartphone applications
have been growing at a high rate. AppStore [1] contains
more than half-a-million applications, and Android Market
[2] has just crossed the two hundred thousand marks. Ap-
ple’s AppStore applications have been tested for attacks,
while the Android Market applications are available to
users without any code review. We can see an increase
in third-party apps of Android Market from about 15,000
third party apps in November 2009 to about 150,000 in
November 2010. These applications can be used by an
attacker that obfuscates code exploiting control depen-
dencies to compromise the confidentiality and integrity
of the Android system and can leak private information
without user authorization. Therefore, there is a need to
provide adequate security mechanisms that resist to the
code obfuscation attacks based on control dependencies
in third-party applications. TaintDroid [3] implements a
dynamic taint analysis mechanism to track information
flow in real-time and to control the handling of private
data in smartphones. It can only track the explicit flows
but not the control flows. Thus, it is not able to detect code
obfuscation attacks based on control dependencies. In a
previous work [4], we have proposed an enhancement of
the TaintDroid approach that propagates taint along control
dependencies to track implicit flows in smartphones. In
this paper, we show that our approach can resist to
code obfuscation attacks based on control dependencies
in the Android system. We use correct and complete taint
propagation rules (see [5] for a formal proof). The rest
of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents
the TaintDroid approach. Section 3 presents some code
obfuscation attacks based on control dependencies that
TaintDroid cannot detect. Section 4 discusses the related
work that can be used to detect code obfuscation attacks
based on control dependencies. Section 5 describes how
our approach can resist to this type of attacks. We provide
our evaluation of our approach in section 6. The limitations
of our work are discussed in section 7. Finally, section 8
concludes with an outline of future work.
II. TAINTDROID
Third-party smartphone applications can leak sensitive
data and compromise confidentiality of Android systems.
TaintDroid [3] is an extension of the Android mobile-
phone platform, implemented in the Dalvik virtual ma-
chine (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Android system architecture.TaintDroid is implemented in
Dalvik VM (yellow)
It uses dynamic taint analysis to track explicit flows and
to control the handling of private data on smartphones. It
addresses different challenges specific to mobile phones
like resource limitations. The TaintDroid process is sum-
marized in Figure 2. First, it assigns taint to sensitive
data (Device id, contacts, SMS/MMS). Then, TaintDroid
tracks propagation of tainted data at the instruction level.
Malicious application can interfere in the taint propagation
level to untaint sensitive data which should be tainted
and in taint sink level to leak these data. TaintDroid
issues warning reports when the tainted data are leaked
Figure 2. TaintDroid process
by malicious applications. This, can be detected when
sensitive data are used in a taint sink (network interface).
One limit of TaintDroid is that it cannot detect control
flows. Thus, it cannot resist to code obfuscation attacks
based on control dependencies. We now present different
examples of code attacks based on control flows that
TaintDroid cannot detect.
III. CODE OBFUSCATION ATTACKS
Sarwar et al.[6] introduce the control dependence class
of attacks against taint-based data leak protection. They
evaluate experimentally the success rates for these attacks
to circumvent taint tracking with TaintDroid. We present
in this section examples of these obfuscated code attacks
based on control dependencies that TaintDroid cannot
detect. The taint is not propagated in the control flow
statements. The attacker exploits untainted variable that
should be tainted to leak private data.
Algorithm 1 Code obfuscation attacks 1
X ← Private Data
for each x ∈ X do
for each s ∈ AsciiTable do
if (s == x) then




Send Network Data(Y )
Algorithm 1 presents the first attack. The variable X
contains the private data. The attacker obfuscates the
code and tries to get each character of X by comparing
it with symbols s in AsciiTable. He stored the right
character founded in Y . At the end of the loop, the
attacker succeeded to know the correct value of the
Private Data stored in Y . The variable Y is not tainted
because TaintDroid does not propagate taint in the control
flows. Thus, Y is leaked through the network connection.
Algorithm 2 presents the second attack. The attacker
saves the private data in variable X . Then, he reads each
character of X and converts it to integer. In the next loop,
he tries to find the value of the integer by incrementing
y. He converts the integer to character and concatenates
all characters in Y to find the value of X . Thus, Y
contains the Private Data value but it is not tainted
Algorithm 2 Code obfuscation attacks 2
X ← Private Data
for each x ∈ X do
n← CharToInt(x)
y ← 0
for i = 0 to n do
y ← y + 1
end for
Y ← Y + IntToChar(y)
end for
Send Network Data(Y )
because TaintDroid does not track control flow. Therefore,
the attacker succeeds to leak the Private Data value
without any warning reports.
Algorithm 3 Code obfuscation attacks 3
X ← Private Data
for each x ∈ X do
n← CharToInt(x)
y ← 0




Y ← Y + 1}
end while
Y ← Y + IntToChar(y)
end for
Send Network Data(Y )
Algorithm 3 presents an obfuscated code attacks based
on an exception. The variable n contains an integer
value that corresponds to the conversion of a character in
private data. The attacker raises an exception n times in
the try bloc. He handles the thrown exception in the catch
bloc by incrementing y to achieve the correct value of
each character in Private Data. By concatenating the
characters, Y contains the value of private data and Y is
not tained because TaintDroid does not detect exceptions
used in control flow. Thus, an attacker can successfully
leak sensitive information by throwing exceptions to
control flow. We present existing approaches that can be
used to detect code obfuscation attacks based on control
dependencies in the next section.
IV. RELATED WORK
Obfuscation techniques are used in the Android plat-
form to protect applications against reverse engineering
[7]. In order to achieve this protection, the obfuscation
methods transform the program code without changing its
behavior. ProGuard [8] is applied to obfuscate program
code and protect the Android application. In this paper, we
study the obfuscation techniques used in malware context
to evade detection of private data leakage in the android
system.
Data Tainting is used to trace data propagation in a
system. The principle of this mechanism is to ”color” (tag)
some of the data in a program and then spread the colors
to other dependent objects. It is used for vulnerability
detection, protection of sensitive data, and more recently,
for analysis of binary malware. A vulnerability is detected
when tainted data is used in a taint sink (network sink).
Data tainting is implemented in interpreters [9],[10] to
analyze sensitive data. It is used on dynamic analysis
[11],[12],[13],[14] at binary level by instrumenting the
code to trace and maintain information about the prop-
agation. Thus, this mechanism suffers from a significant
performance overhead that does not encourage their use
in real-time applications.
Privacy issues on smartphones are a growing concern.
Enck et al. [15] designed and implemented the Dalvik
decompiler “ded”, dedicated to retrieve and analyze the
Java source of an Android Market application. The de-
compiler extraction occurs in three stages: retargeting,
optimization, and decompilation. They identify class and
method constants and variables in the retargeting phase.
Then, they make bytecode optimization and decompile the
retargeted .class files. Their analysis is based on automated
tests and manual inspection. A slight current limitation of
ded decompiler is that it requires the Java source code to
be available. FLOWDROID [16] is a static taint analysis
tool that automatically scans Android applications for
privacy-sensitive data leaks. The static analysis approaches
implemented in smartphones allow detecting data leaks but
they cannot capture all runtime configurations and inputs,
unlike dynamic analysis approaches.
TaintDroid [3] implements dynamic taint analysis in
real-time applications. Its design was inspired by these
prior works, but addresses different challenges specific to
mobile phones like resource limitations. AppFence [17]
extends Taintdroid to implement policy enforcement. A
significant limitation of these approaches is that they track
only explicit flows and they cannot detect control flows.
Thus, they cannot detect code obfuscation attacks based
on control dependencies.
Cavallaro et al. [18] describe the evasion techniques
that can easily defeat dynamic information flow analy-
sis. These evasion attacks can use control dependencies.
They demonstrate that a malware writer can propagate an
arbitrarily large amount of information through control
dependencies. Cavallaro et al. show that it is necessary
to reason about assignments that take place on the pro-
gram branches. We implement the same idea in our taint
propagation rules.
Some implementations exist in the literature to track
control flows [19], [20], [21], [22]. They combine static
and dynamic taint analysis techniques to correctly identify
implicit flow of information and to detect a leak of sen-
sitive information. DTA++ [21] presents an enhancement
of dynamic taint analysis to track control flows. However
DTA++ is evaluated only on benign applications and it is
not tested on malicious programs in which an adversary
uses implicit flows to obfuscate code. Furthermore, these
approaches are not implemented in smartphones applica-
tion and do not formally give a proof to resist to code
obfuscation attacks based on control dependencies.
Fenton [23] proposed a Data Mark Machine, an abstract
model, to handle control flows. Fenton gives a formal
description of his model and a proof of its correctness in
terms of information flow. Aries [24] considers that writing
to a particular location within a branch is disallowed
when the security class associated with that location is
equal or less restrictive than the security class of the
program counter. The approach of Aries is based only on
high and low security classes. Denning [25] enhances the
run time mechanism defined by Fenton with a compile
time mechanism to detect all control flows. The updating
instructions are inserted whether the branch is taken or
not to reflect the information flow. Denning and Denning
[26] gave an informal argument for the soundness of their
compile time mechanism. We draw our inspiration from
the Denning approach, but we formally define a set of
correct and complete taint propagation rules to avoid code
obfuscation attacks. Graa et al. [4] propose an approach
that combine dynamic taint analysis and static analysis
to track control flows in embedded systems such as the
Google Android operating system. But, this approach was
not proven to resist to code obfuscation attacks based on
control dependencies.
We were inspired by these prior works, but we combine
static and dynamic analysis to avoid code obfuscation
attacks based on control dependencies in the Android
system. Precisely, we enhance the TaintDroid approach by
propagating taint along control flow to taint all sensitive
data. We describe our approach in more details in the
following section.
V. DETECTING OBFUSCATED CODE ATTACKS
The attacker exploits control dependencies to launch
code obfuscation attacks because TaintDroid cannot prop-
agate the taint tags through control flows. We aim to
enhance the TaintDroid approach by tracking implicit
flow in the Android system. To do so, we integrate a
control flow module in the TaintDroid system. We use
also a hybrid approach that combines static and dynamic
analyses. TaintDroid does not taint assigned variables in
control flow statements. So, we have an under-tainting
problem. We formally specify two propagation rules to
solve the under-tainting problem and to avoid the code
obfuscation attack based on control dependencies. We
present in the following our technical and formal approach.
A. Technical Approach Overview
In a previous work [4], we have proposed a technical ap-
proach that enhances TaintDroid by tracking control flow
in the Android system. This approach combines the static
and dynamic analyses. In a first step, we use static analysis
to detect control dependencies. This is achieved by using
the control flow graphs [27], [28] which will be analyzed
to determine branches in the conditional structure. We
assign a basic block to each control flow branch. Then,
we detect the flow of the condition-dependencies from
blocks in the graph. Our approach allows us to handle
not executed branches by detecting variable assignments
in a basic block of the control flow graph. In a second
step, we apply the dynamic analysis using information
provided by the static analysis. The dynamic analysis
allows tainting, in the conditional instruction, all variables
which a value is assigned to. We create an array of context
taints that includes all condition taints and we apply the
propagation rules to correctly taint variables to which a
value is assigned whether the branch is taken or not. We
Figure 3. Modified architecture to handle implicit flow in TaintDroid
system.
make a special exception handling to detect obfuscated
code attacks based on an exception and to avoid leaking
information. The catch block depends on the type of the
exception object raised in the throw statement. If the type
of exception that occurred is listed in a catch block, the
exception is passed to the catch block. So, an edge is added
in the CFG from the throw statement to the catch block
to indicate that the throw statement will transfer control
to the appropriate catch block. If an exception occurs, the
current context taint and the exceptions taint are stored.
The variables assigned in any of the catch blocks will
be tainted depending on the exceptions taint. Each catch
block has an entry in the context taint for this purpose.
To track control flow, we have added an implicit flow
module in the Dalvik VM bytecode verifier which checks
instructions of methods at load time. We have defined two
additional rules to propagate taint in the control flow. At
class load time, we have created an array of variables to
which a value is assigned to handle the branch that is not
executed. Figure 3 presents the modified architecture to
handle implicit flow in TaintDroid system.
In the following, we formally specify two propagation
rules to avoid code obfuscation attacks based on control
dependencies.
B. Formal Approach Overview
To launch a code obfuscation attack, an attacker exploits
the under-tainting problem i.e. that some values should be
marked as tainted, but are not. We formally specify the
under-tainting problem and we present two propagation
rules to solve it and to avoid the code obfuscation attack.
We formally specify the under-tainting problem based on
Denning’s information flow model. However, we assign
taints to the objects instead of assigning security classes.
Thus, the class combining operator “⊕” is used in our
formal specification to combine taints of objects.
Definition. Under-Tainting Problem
We have a situation of under-tainting when x depends
on a condition, the value of x is assigned in the condi-
tional branch and condition is tainted but x is not tainted.
Formally, an under-tainting occurs when there is a variable
x and a condition such that:








• Dependency(x, condition) defines an information





Obfuscated code attack solution
To launch code obfuscation attacks, the attacker exploits
untainted variables that should be tainted. We specify a
set of formally rules that define the taint propagation
and allow detecting the obfuscated code attacks based on
control dependencies. By using these rules, all variables
to which a value is assigned in the conditional branch
are tainted whether the branch is taken or not. The taint
of these variables reflects the dependency to a condition.
We consider that Context Taint is the taint of the
condition.
• Rule 1: if the value of x is modified and x depends
on the condition and the branch is taken, we will
apply the rule (2) to taint x.
where: The predicate BranchTaken(br, conditionalst)
specifies that branch br in the conditionalstatement
is executed. So, an explicit flow which contains x is
executed. IsModified (x, explicitflowst) associates with x




• Rule 2: if the value of y is assigned to x and x
depends on the condition and the branch br in the
conditional statement is not taken (x depends only on
implicit flow and does not depend on explicit flow),
we will apply the rule (3) to taint x.
In a previous work [5], we gave a proof of the com-
pleteness of those rules. Also, we provided a correct
and complete algorithm based on these rules that allows






To test the effectiveness of our approach, we have
implemented the three obfuscated code attacks based on
control dependencies presented in section III.
Figure 4. Code obfuscation attack 1.
We have tested these attacks using a Nexus One mobile
device running Android OS version 2.3 modified to track
control flows. We use the Traceview tool to evaluate the
performace of these attacks. We present both the inclusive
and exclusive times. Exclusive time is the time spent in
the method. Inclusive time is the time spent in the method
plus the time spent in any called functions. We install the
TaintDroidNotify application to enable notifications on the
device when tainted data is leaked.
Let us consider the first obfuscated code attack (see
Figure 4). The first loop is used to fill the table of
ASCII characters. The attacker tries to get the private data
(user contact name= ‘Graa Mariem’) by comparing it with
symboles of Ascii table in the second loop. The taint of
the user contact name is ((u4)0× 00000002).
The variable x is tainted because it belongs to the
tainted character string X . Thus, the condition (x ==
TabAsc[j]) is tainted. Our system allows propagating the
taint in the control flow. Using the first rule, Y is tainted
and Taint(Y ) = Taint(x == TabAsc[j])⊕ Taint(Y +
TabAsc[j]). We can show in the log file given in Figure
5(a) that Y is tainted with the same taint as the user
contact name. A notification appears (see Figure 6(a))
reporting the leakage of Y that contains the value of
private data. The execution of the first algorithm takes
88 ms as Inclusive CPU Time using Taintdroid modified
to track control flows and 36ms in android not modified.
Figure 7. Code obfuscation attack 2.
The second obfuscated code attack is illustrated in
Figure 7. The attacker tries to get a secret information
X that is the IMEI of the smartphone. The taint of the
IMEI is ((u4)0 × 00000400). The variable x is tainted
because it belongs to the character string X that is
tainted. The result n of converting x to integer is tainted.
Thus, the condition (j = 0 to n) is tainted. Using the
first rule, y is tainted and Taint(y) = Taint(j = 0
to n) ⊕ Taint(y + 1). In the first loop, the condition
x ∈ X is tainted. We apply the first rule, Y is tainted
and Taint(Y ) = Taint(x ∈ X)⊕ Taint(Y + (char)y).
This result is shown in the log file given in Figure 5(b).
The leakage of the private data event is presented in the
notification (see Figure 6(b)). The execution of the second
algorithm takes 101 ms as Exclusive CPU Time using
Taintdroid modified to track control flows and 20ms in
unmodified android. The execution time in our approach
is more important because it includes the time of the taint
propagation in the control flow.
The third obfuscated code attack is illustrated in Figure
8. The attacker exploits exception to launch obfuscated
code attacks and to leak sensitive data (phone number).
The division by zero throws an ArithmeticException. This
exception is tainted and its taint depends on the while
condition y < n. Also, the while condition (y < n)
is tainted because the variable n that corresponds to the
conversion of a character in phone number is tainted.
TaintDroid does not assign taint to exception. We de-
fine taint of exception(Taint Exception = ((u4)0 ×




Figure 5. Log files of Code obfuscation attacks
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6. Notification reporting the leakage of sensitive data
catch block. We apply the first rule to taint y. We obtain
Taint(y) = Taint(exception) ⊕ Taint(y + 1). Finally,
the string Y which contains the private data is tainted
and Taint(Y ) = Taint(x ∈ X)⊕ Taint(Y + (char)y).
In the log file given in Figure 5(c), we can show that
the taint of Y is the combination of the taint of the
exception(((u4)0× 00010000)) and the taint of the phone
number (((u4)0×00000008)). A warning message appears
indicated the leakage of sensitive information (see the
notification in Figure 6(c)). The execution of the third
algorithm takes 1385 ms as Inclusive CPU Time using
Taintdroid modified to track control flows and 1437 ms
in unmodified android. This difference is due to the taint
propagation in the control flow.
VII. DISCUSSION
Side Channels
Our approach makes it possible to detect obfuscated
code attacks applied in the control flow statement (if,
loop, while, exception...) in order to leak sensitive
information. But, it cannot detect all obfuscated code
attacks.
Algorithm 4 Timing Attack





y ← (StopT ime− StartT ime)
Y ← Y + IntToChar(y)
Send Network Data(Y )
The condition of the control flow statement includes a
character of the private data. Most presented attacks need
to be applied in a loop to leak one character at a time. A
side channel attack is another category of attacks that can
be used to obfuscate code and to leak private information.
Figure 8. Code obfuscation attacks 3.
It is based on information (timing information, power
consumption,...) gained from a medium and used to easily
extract the secret data. It is difficult to detect this category
of attacks. Let us consider the timing attack presented
in Algorithm 4. It is a side channel attack in which the
attacker attempts to get private data by analyzing the
difference in time readings before and after a waiting
period. The sleep period duration is the value of the
private variable.
Algorithm 5 Timing Attack 2
X ← Private Data





y ← (StopT ime− StartT ime)
Y ← Y + IntToChar(y)
end for
Send Network Data(Y )
The difference in time y is not tainted because it does
not depend on the tainted variables. It is assigned to
Y that is leaked through the network connection. Our
approach cannot directly detect this timing attack and the
private information will be leaked without any warning
report. However, this timing attack can be detected by
tainting the system clock. Thus, the ReadSystemTime()
function returns a tainted value. Therefore, the StartTime
is tainted. Also, we propose to add rule that propagates
the private data taint to the clock if Wait() function
has a tainted parameter. Thus, the taint of StopTime
includes the private data taint. Thus, the difference in
time readings before and after a waiting period is tainted.
Therefore, the attacker cannot get the value of private
data using this timing attack. The same attack can be
written differently (see Algorithm 5). We use a loop
statement to get the private data. The loop condition is
tainted and propagated in the loop block. Thus, we apply
the first rule: Y is tainted and Taint(Y ) = Taint(x ∈
X) ⊕ Taint(Y + IntToChar(y)). So, the private data
cannot be leaked.
TaintDroid cannot track taint tags on Direct Buffer
objects, because the data is stored in opaque native
data structures. The side channel attack presented in
Algorithm 6 exploits this limitation to leak private data.
The memory buffer created is used to write a tainted
variable at a specific address. Then, the attacker reads
the content of the Direct Buffer specific address. The
buffer contains private data but it is not tainted. Using
our approach, we can avoid the leak of private data
because Y will be tainted and Taint(Y ) = Taint(x ∈
X)⊕ Taint(Y + IntToChar(y)).
Algorithm 6 DirectBuffer Attack
X ← Private Data
D ← NewDirectBuffer()
for each x ∈ X do
n← CharToInt(x)
DirectBufferWrite(n;D(0× 00))
y ← DirectBufferRead(D; 0× 00)
Y ← Y + IntToChar(y)
end for
Send Network Data(Y )
Note that our approach will not detect this side channel
attack if the attack code is not included in a control
statement. To detect this direct buffer attack, we need to
refine our approach by adding a taint propagation rule
that associates a private data taint to Direct Buffer objects
at the execution of the DirectBufferWrite() function. This
solution is similar to the one used in the Algorithm 4 to
detect a side channel attack by tainting the clock.
False positives
In our approach, we taint all variables in the condi-
tional branch. This, can lead to an over-tainting problem
(false positives). The problem has been addressed in [21]
and [29] but not solved though. Kang et al. [21] used
a diagnosis technique to select branches that could be
responsible for under-tainting and propagated taint only
along these branches in order to reduce over-tainting.
However a smaller amount of over tainting occurs even
with DTA++, as we can see by comparing the ”Optimal”
and ”DTA++” results in the evaluation. Bao et al. [29]
define the concept of strict control dependencies (SCDs)
and introduce its semantics. They use a static analysis
to identify predicate branches that give rise to SCDs.
They do not consider all control dependencies to reduce
the number of false positives. Their implementation gives
similar results as DTA++ in many cases, but is based
on the syntax of a comparison expression. Contrariwise,
DTA++ uses a more general and precise semantic-level
condition, implemented using symbolic execution.
Our approach can cause an over-tainting problem. But
it provides more security because all confidential data are
tainted. So, the sensitive information cannot be leaked.
We are interested in solving the under tainting because
we consider that false negatives are more dangerous than
false positives since false negatives can create security
flaws. To balance (trade-off) between over-tainting and
leakage of private information, we plan to apply expert
rules that allow to reduce the over-tainting problem and
protect private data. This represents a relevant extension
of the approach presented in this paper.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In order to protect smartphones from obfuscated code
attacks based on control dependencies, we have proposed
a technical and formal approach that combines static and
dynamic analysis. In this paper, we presented obfuscated
attacks in control flow statements that exploit taint prop-
agation to leak sensitive information. We formally spec-
ified two propagation rules to detect these attacks based
on control dependencies. We showed how our approach
can successfully avoid them. Thus, using our technique,
malicious applications cannot bypass the Android system
and get privacy sensitive information through obfuscated
code attacks. Future work will be to characterize the
performance of our enhanced android system that tracks
control flows and compare it with the original android
system. Also, we will test more complex conditional
structures (nested control branches, switch,. . . ) and other
types of attacks based on control dependencies using our
approach. Finally, we will plan to refine our apporach to
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